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Economists generally agree that the market will fail to provide sufficient quantities
of R&D as it has some characteristics of a public good. But how should policy
bridge the gap between the private and social rate of return? A tax-based subsidy
seems the market-oriented response as it leaves the choice of how to conduct and
pursue R&D programs in the hands of the private sector. There areseveral
drawbacks to this tool, however, compared with government financing and/or
conducting the R&D program directly (see Klette, Moen and Griliches, 1998).
Perhaps the primary objection is that fiscal incentives are simply ineffective in
raising private R&D spending -theresponse elasticity is so low it would take a
huge tax change to generate the socially desirable level of spending. This was the
conventional wisdom among economists until recently, so it is the key focus of
this paper. We address the issue of how governments (sometimes inadvertently)
have used the tax system to promote R&D, how researchers have evaluated these
effects, and what the results of their evaluations are.
There are other objections to the use of the tax system to which we will be
paying less attention. First, the projects that should be promoted from a social
view are those with the largest gaps between the social and private return. Yet
private sector firms will use any credits to first fund R&D projects with the highest
private rates of return. In principle the state could do a lot better by targeting
the projects with the highest spillover gap. In practice this maybe very hard to
deliver because of the intrinsic uncertainty of knowledge creation and because of
1the tendency of states to reward lobbyists and bureaucrats rather than take the
optimal decisions.' In the face of pervasive government failure to implement the
optimal subsidy policy, tax credits appear more attractive.
Using the tax system to stimulate R&D is far from the ultimate panacea for
failures in the market for knowledge. Implementation in the existing political
and tax environment has meant that there are frequent changes in the fiscal
incentives faced by firms that affect the costs of performing R&D in different
ways for different companies at different times. This heterogeneity is a burden for
companies and policy makers but is a boon for social scientists. A long standing
problem in the investment literature is the intractability of finding exogenous
variation in the user cost of capital. The heterogeneity across firms and time in
the cost of capital for this type of investment has the potential to help identify
parameters of the underlying R&D investment demand equation. The frequent
changes of government policy offer a rare opportunity to generate some exogenous
movement in the price of R&D (even across firms) that could be used to identify
a key part of the neoclassical model. What's bad for the economy may be good
for the econometricians!
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we examine the tax treatment
of R&D in an international context and introduce the major issues. In section
3 we critically outline the methodologies researchers have used to examine the
effects of tax incentives on R&D. In section 4 we present the survey of results and
in section 5 we offer some concluding comments.
1Q this point, see Cohen and Noll (1991) for discussion of the issue and a series of examples
drawn from the U. S. experience of the past thirty years. They demonstrate that large federal
R&D projects have frequently been continued well past the point where expected costs exceeded
expected benefits due to the existence of stakeholders that had legislative influence.
22. The taxtreatmentof R&D across countries
2.1. The current position
The treatment of R&D by the tax system various extensively between countries
and over time. Table 1, which is drawn from many sources, summarizes the
position in approximately 1995 to the best of our knowledge.2 The second column
of the table attempts to give the definition of R&D that is used for the purpose of
the tax credit, which is often somewhat more restrictive than the Frascati manual
(OECD 1980) definition, but not always. The next two columns give the rates at
which non-capital R&D and capital R&D are depreciated for tax purposes. 100
percent means that the quantity is expensed. In most cases it is also possible
to elect to amortize R&D expenditure over 5 years. This might conceivably be
an attractive option if operating loss carryforwards are not available (to use the
R&D expense as a deduction even if no current tax is owed), but in most cases
tax losses can be carried forward and back (see column 7).
[Table 1 about here]
Given that R&D capital expenditure is typically only 10-13% of business R&D,
and that the business R&D-GDP ratio is typically 1-2% (OECD 1994), implying
an R&D capital equipment-GDP ratio of 0.1-0.2%, a remarkable amount of time
has been spent in many of these countries tinkering with the expensing and depre-
ciation rules for capital equipment used in R&D activities.3 Although almost all
2Sources include Asmussen and Berriot (1993), Australian Bureau of Industry Economics
(1993), Bell (1995), Bloom, Chennells, Griffith and Van Reenen (1998), Griffith, Sandler and
Van Reenen (1995), Harhoff (1994), Hiramatsu (1995), Leyden and Link (1993). McFetridge
and Warda (1983), Seyvet (1995), Warda (1994), and KPMG (1995).
31n addition to the features of the tax system targeted toward R&D equipment expenditures
at the federal level in many countries, in many U.S. states there is a special sales tax provision
3countries (except for the UK) treat this kind of capital expenditure somewhat like
ordinary investment) many have used complex speeded-up depreciation schemes
at one time or another to give a boost to a R&D capital equipment investment;
this can be often be justified by the simple fact that the economic life of this kind
of specialized equipment is likely to be shorter than that for other types of capi-
tal. Frequently the depreciation involved is also subject to the R&D tax credit.
Normally buildings or plant for use by an R&D laboratory do not participate in
these schemes.
Columns 5 and 6 characterize the tax credit, if there is one. The rate and the
base above which the rate applies are shown; when the base is zero, the credit
is not incremental, but applies to all qualifying R&D expense. At the present
time, it appears that only France, Japan, Korea, Spain, the United States, and
Taiwan have a true incremental R&D tax credit, and they each use a slightly
different formula for the base. Canada has a non-incremental credit and Brazil
has a non-incremental credit that is restricted to computer industry research.
Column 8 shows that many countries also have provisions that specially favor
R&D in small and medium-sized companies. In France, for example, this takes
the form of a ceiling on the credit allowed that is equal to 40 million francs in
1991-1993 (approximately $6.7M). The effect is to tilt the credit toward smaller
firms, whereas direct R&D subsidies in France go to large firms to a great exteut
(Seyvet 1995). An exception to this rule is Australia, which has a minimum size of
research program to which the tax preference of 150% expensing applies: $20,000.
This seems to be related more to the administrative cost of handling the R&D tax
which exempts firms from paying sales tax on purchases or repairs of this kind of equipment.
This amounts to an additional tax credit of about 4-8percentin the states that have this
provision.
4concession than to any policy decision (Bell 1995, Australian Bureau of Industry
Economics 1993).
The next two columns give any differences in tax treatment that apply to
R&D done abroad by domestic firms or R&D done in the country by foreign-
owned firms. For the first type of R&D, any special incentives (beyond 100%
deductibility) will typically not apply, except that up to 10% of the project cost
for Australian-owned firms can be incurred outside Australia. For the second type
of R&D, it is frequently difficult to tell from the summarized tax regulations. In
Korea and Australia, foreign firms do not participate in any of the incentive
programs. In the United States and Canada, they are treated like domestic firms,
except that they do not receive an R&D grant in Canada when their tax liability
is negative.
The final column tells whether the incremental tax credit is treated as taxable
income, that is, whether the expensing deduction for R&D is reduced by the
amount of the tax credit. Whether or not this is true typically has a major effect
on the marginal incentive faced by a tax-paying firm, but it is somewhat hard to
ascertain in many cases whether this feature applies.
2.2.Changesover time
Reforms of systems of taxing corporate income over the past decade have tended
towards lowering statutory rates and broadening the tax base. What has happened
to the tax treatment of R&D over that time period? This section documents some
of the main changes in the tax treatment of R&D in eight countries over the period
1979 to 1994 (see Bloom et al (1998) for more details). It is worth noting that the
cost of R&D figures reported in this section are calculated assuming that the R&D
5investment qualifies for any credit, that the amount of credit is not constrained
by any capping rules and that the firm has sufficient tax liability against which to
offset the credit. In the next section we investigate how the various credits affect
firms in different positions.
The following assumptions are made concerning the type of R&D investment
to be analysed. We consider a domestic investment, financed from retained earn-
ings, in the manufacturing sector and divided into three types of asset for use in
R&D -currentexpenditure, buildings, and plant and machinery. An important
assumption in the modelling strategy used here is that current expenditure on
R&D is treated as an investment -thatis, its full value is not realised immedi-
ately but accrues over several years. Current expenditure on R&D is assumed to
depreciate at 30% a year, buildings at 3.61% and plant and machinery at 12.64%.
[Figure 1 here]
Figure 1 shows how the tax treatment of R&D has changed over time. This
graph shows the tax component of the user cost of R&D for a typical R&D4 in-
vestment in Australia, Canada, France and the USA. These are the four countries
that had the most generous treatment of R&D. The tax component user cost
measures the generosity of the tax system in subsidising R&D (see appendix). In
general, the full user cost depends on differential inflation and interest rates, but
we have set the real interest rate to be 10 per cent across all countries and years
to highlight the tax element of the user cost. The user cost is weighted across
assets (90% current expenditure, 3.6% buildings, and 6.4% plant and machinery).
4'Typical' means a domestic investment financed from retained earnings for a firm which is
not tax exhausted or hitting any maximum tax credit caps.
6A value of unity signals that the tax system is broadly neutral with respect to
R&D. This can occur if all R&D was fully written off and there were no special
tax credits.
Taking any year in isolation, it is clear that large differences exist among
countries, a feature highlighted in previous studies. It appears that Canada has
the most generous treatment of RD, except during three years in the mid 1980s
when Australia gave a larger subsidy. Furthermore, in all of these countries the
tax treatment of R&D has become more generous since the early 1980s, although
there has been considerable turbulence. The relative position of countries has
moved around and there are substantial changes in the tax wedge on RAD due to
changes in tax policies. The mid to late 1980s was a period of particular change.
This turbulence illustrates the difficulty for firms considering long term investment
plans, that there may be considerable uncertainty about the permanence of fiscal
incentives.
The reasons for the periods of large change in the cost of R&D vary across
countries. In Australia, the large drop in 1985 was due to the introduction of
a 150% 'superdeductibility' for R&D. The subsequent increase was due to the
lowering of Australia's statutory rate of corporation tax. The generosity of the
Canadian system is driven by the fact that the credit rate is relatively high on the
incremental amount of R&D. The fall in the cost of R&D in 1988 was precipitated
by the introduction of a second credit in Ontario (the province which we model
here). In France, the introduction of the credit in 1983 had much less effect
than the redefinition of the base (from a moving base to a fixed base and then
back again) which occurred between 1987-1990. Similarly in the USA, the base
re-definition in 1990 had a greater effect than the introduction of the credit in
71981. These points illustrate that the statutory credit rate is not of over-riding
importance to the cost of R&D. The design and implementation of the schemes
(such as the definition of the base) and the effects of other parts of the tax system
(such as the statutory tax rate) are at least of equal importance in explaining the
trends over time.
[Figure 2 here]
Figure 2 shows the tax wedge in the four less generous countries. In these
countries the tax systems are broadly neutral to R&D (i.e., the tax wedge is close
to zero). There have not been many changes in the tax treatment of R&D in these
countries over this period. Japan occupies an intermediate position, however, as
the only country in this group which has an R&D tax credit although the UK
does also give an allowance for R&D capital expenditure.
Another striking feature of Figures 1 and 2 taken together is that the range
of the user costs at the end of the period is greater than at the start. In 1979
the mean effective marginal tax wedge on the typical R&D investment was 0.953
with a standard deviation of 0.098. By 1994 the mean had fallen to 0.857 and the
standard deviation increased to 0.163
2.3.Heterogeneityof the Effects of the Tax System
One of the striking findings of the flourishing of micro-economic studies in the
last two decades is the huge heterogeneity between different firms. The way in
which the R&D tax credit creates heterogeneous and often perverse incentives
has been a key feature of the debate on the (un)desirability of R&D tax credits.
The heterogeneity emerges in many ways. First, unless there is a full refund then
8many firms will not be able to use the full value of the tax credit because they
do not have sufficient taxable profits (e.g. young firms or firms in recession).
Carryforwards and carrybacks will compensate for this to an extent depending on
interest rates and expectations of future taxable profits. Second, there are usually
caps limiting the maximum credit available. Third, the definition of the base
will affect firms in different ways. A moving base will mean that firms who are
intending to increase their R&D may be put off because their current increases
increase the size of the base which will limit their future tax rebates (Eisner et al,
1982).
To illustrate the importance of heterogeneity, Figure 3 shows the distribution
of the user cost of R&D in the US over time. There is considerable heterogeneity
for most of the period. The reduction in the 1990s is due to moving from a
moving base to a fixed base in 1989. A similar graph for Canada is given in
Figure 4. This variation between firms is almost certainly an additional source of
uncertainty facing firms. It offers a potential source of identification in firm panel
studies of R&D.
[Figures 3 and 4 here]
3. Effectiveness of the R&D TaxCredit
There are two approaches to evaluating the effectiveness of any tax policy designed
to correct the insufficient supply of a quasi-public good. The first asks whether
the level of the good supplied after the implementation of the policy is such that
the social return is equal to the social cost. In this situation, that would involve
comparing the marginal return to industrial R&D dollars at the societal level to
9the opportunity cost of using the extra tax dollars in another way, for example,
in deficit reduction. This is a very tall order, and policy evaluation of the tax
credit usually falls back on the second method, which is to compare the amount
of incremental industrial R&D to the loss in tax revenue. The implicit assumption
in this method is that the size of the subsidy has been determined and that the
only question to be answered is whether it is best administered as a tax credit
or a direct subsidy. Obviously, this kind of benefit-cost ratio is only very loosely
connected with the magnitude of the gap between the social and private returns
to R&D, if at all. It might be that the social return from additional industrial
research is very high. If it is very high one may be willing to give up more tax
dollars than the actual research induced by the tax subsidy. On the contrary, if
the social return is only slightly higher than the private return, lowering the cost
of research might cause the firm to do too much.5 In this case, even though the
tax credit induces more industrial R&D than the lost tax revenue, it would not be
a good idea, because one could have spent that tax revenue on some other activity
which had a higher social return. Fortunately, the available evidence on the social
return to R&D suggests that the first case is more likely than the second.
Most evaluations of the effectiveness of the R&D tax credit have been con-
ducted using the second method, that is, as benefit-cost analyses. We need to
calculate both the amount of R&D induced by the tax credit, and computing the
costs requires estimating how much tax revenue is lost due to the presence of the
credit. The ratio of these two quantities is the benefit-cost ratio; if it is greater
than one, the tax credit is a more cost-effective way to achieve the given level of
5Some government policies towards R&D are explicitly aimed at reducing duplicative R&D
-forexample, in the U. S., government sponsored consortia such as SEMATECH, as well as the
antitrust exemption contained in the National Cooperative Research Act of 1982.
10R&D subsidy; if it is less than one, it would be cheaper to simply fund the R&D
directly. This part of the paper critically reviews the methodology underlying
these evaluations and surveys the resulting evidence, including the small number
of studies that have been conducted using data from outside the United States.
3.1. Costs of R&D tax support
The first ingredient in doing a benefit-cost analysis of the tax credit is the compu-
tation of total cost. The total social cost consists of the net tax revenue loss due
to the credit plus the costs of administering it, both to the firm and to the taxing
authority. In practice, the cost computed has been simply the gross tax credit
claimed. At best this has been done by simply adding up the credits claimed by
the firms that use the credit (Mansfield 1986, Hall 1993), sometimes adding in
the unused credits that have been used to offset prior-year liabilities (GAO 1989).
Occasionally estimates have been produced relying only on representative or av-
erage firm behavior; this method is likely to produce erroneous results given the
extreme heterogeneity in the data. Either way, this type of analysis ignores the
fact that the existence and use of the R&D tax credit may have implications for
the overall tax position of the firm, so that the net change in tax revenue because
of the credit is not captured by simply adding up the credits. It is likely that
these other effects are relatively small, but by no means certain.
The second omission in the conventional computation is the administrative cost
of the tax credit. The GAO Study of 1989, updated in 1995, makes it clear that
these costs can be high, but offers no estimate of their magnitude. Difficulties arise
in two areas: the definition of eligible R&D, which typically requires a distinction
between routine and innovative research, and may be more restrictive than the
11definition used by the firm's accountants, and the performance of research by
outside subcontractors. For example, the U. S. Internal Revenne Service appears
to have taken the position that the tax credit should flow to the organization
that will pay for the R&D "in the normal course of events," rather than to the
organization that bears the risk of the investment. Stoifregen (1995) argues that
these ambiguities in interpretation of the law also impose costs on the firms, in
that they will be unsure whether the R&D they are undertaking will fall within
the area delimited by the tax regulations as legitimate qualified expenditures.
The GAO reports that almost 80% of returns claiming R&D credits are audited
in the U. S. with an average net adjustment downward of about 20% of the credits
claimed.
3.2. The benefits of R&D support: Evaluation methods
Can the R&D tax credit stimulate as much research per dollar as funding the
R&D directly? Conceptually, measuring the amount of R&D induced by a tax
credit is a ceteris pan bus exercise, in which we attempt to ask the question: "How
much more R&D did firms do given the existence of a tax credit than they would
have done if there had been no credit?" The counterfactual is never observed,
and researchers fall back on a variety of methods to try to estimate the level of
R&D without the subsidy. We consider three evaluation methods.
3.2.1. Event and Case Studies
Event studies typically rely on the assumption that the event being studied (such
as the introduction of a tax credit) is a surprise to the economic agents it affects.
They are usually conducted using financial market data, although this is not
12necessary. The method involves comparing behavior before a surprise change in
policy is announced with behavior after the announcement in order to deduce the
effect of the policy change. In this instance, such a comparison can take the form of
comparing the market value of R&D-oriented firms before and after the tax credit
legislation was considered and passed, or of comparing R&D investment plans for
the same time period before and after the legislation (An example of the former
method is Berger 1993 and of the latter is Eisner, as reported in Collins 1983). A
problem with many of these studies is that other events are not conditioned out
(such as demand growth accompanying the policy change)
A case study is essentially a retrospective event study. You simply ask the
senior managers of industrial firms how their R&D spending has been affected by
the introduction of an R&D tax credit (for example, Mansfield 1986). These are
often combined with an econometric analysis (e.g. Mansfield and Switzer, 1985
who looked at 55 Canadian firms). These have the advantage that (in principle)
the manager controls for other factors when she answers the question. The main
problem is that managers may not give the right answer to the question, for
subjective or perceptual reasons.6 Furthermore, event and case studies tend to be
focused on rather small samples of firms, due to the cost of collecting the data to
perform them.
6There is a general tendency in surveys for managers to focus on their firm's (or their own
individual) idiosyncratic brilliance rather than general features of the economic environment as
the source of positive change.
133.2.2. Natural Experiments: R&D demand equation with a shift pa-
rameter for the credit.
Here one constructs as well as possible an equation that predicts the level of
R&D investment (rjt)asa function of past R&D, past output, expected demand,
perhaps cash flow and price variables, and so forth (different studies have different
conditioning variables -callthese Xj).Adummy variable is included (C), equal
to one when the credit is available and zero otherwise. For example:
a0 + 3C + 'xt+u (3.1)
The magnitude of the estimated coefficient of the dummy (/3) is equal to the
amount of R&D induced by the presence of the credit. If this exercise is conducted
using firm-level data (ifirm), the best method is to measure the availability of
the credit at the firm level, that is, taking account of the usability of the credit.
If it is conducted at the macro-economic or industry level, the identification of
the credit effect will generally come from the variation in R&D demand over time
(C =Ce).(Examples: Eisner, Albert, and Sullivan 1993; Swenson 1992; Berger
1993; Baily and Lawrence 1992; McCutchen 1993). The advantage of this method
is its relative simplicity; it eliminates the need to perform the relatively complex
computations to determine the actual level of the tax credit subsidy for each firm.
The disadvantage is that the measurement is relatively imprecise, because there
is no guarantee that all firms are facing the same magnitude of credit at any
given point in time. In fact, we have seen how great the variation in the user
cost has been after the credit was introduced in Figures 3 (for the U. S.) and 4
(for Canada). In addition, if the variation in the credit dummy is over time, it is
14very possible that other forces which increase aggregate industrial R&D spending
(such as global economic conditions, trade, etc.) and that are not included in the
R&D equation may lead to a spurious conclusion about the effectiveness of the
tax credit. In other words the credit dummy is not separately identified from a
set of time dummies.
3.2.3. Quasi-Experiments: Price Elasticity Estimation.
This method is similar to the previous method, in that an R&D equation that
controls for the non-tax determinants of R&D is estimated, but in this case a
price variable -theuser cost of R&D -thatcaptures the marginal cost of R&D
is included in the equation (p). As with equation (3.1) lags may be introduced
into the explanatory variables. The estimated response of R&D to this price
variable is converted to an elasticity of R&D with respect to price. If the price
variable includes the implicit subsidy given by the tax system to R&D, this is a
direct measure of the response of R&D to its tax treatment (Examples: Hall 1993,
Dagenais et a!, 1998).
=o+++ uj (3.2)
Even if the price variable does not contain a measure of the tax subsidy, it
is possibly to use the measured elasticity of R&D with respect to price to infer
the response induced by a tax reduction of a given size. This involves the step of
estimating the effect of a given policy change (such as an increase in the credit rate
on the user cost of R&D) which is a mechanical exercise given one's definition of
the price. The second step is using the estimates of the model to predict what will
happen to R&D following a change in the price. In the most simple case, holding
15all else constant, if we estimate a price elasticity of -0.5 and the effective marginal
R&D tax credit is .05, or a 5 percent reduction in cost, then the estimated increase
in R&D from the tax credit will be 2.5 percent (Examples: Collins 1983; GAO
1989; Mansfield 1986). Of course this is too partial, a reduction in costs will
also affect the firm's output and if output is in the equation, the full effects are
likely to be larger as output will rise as costs fall. There will also be possible
spillover effects, and so on. However, researchers have tended to focus on the
output-constant price effects (see below for more 'structural' approaches).
The advantage of this method is that it is better grounded in economic the-
ory and estimates the price response of RSD directly. Thus it will be somewhat
more accurate than the previous method. Using the tax price elasticity of R&D
(the first variant) has a couple of disadvantages: First, because the firm benefits
directly from the amount of R&D qualified to receive the tax credit, it is possible
that it will relabel some expenses as R&D (legitimately or illegitimately) and the
"true" induced R&D will therefore be an overestimate. Secondly, and perhaps
most seriously, because the tax credit depends on a variety of firm characteris-
tics, such as its operating loss position, how much foreign income it repatriates,
and so forth, the R&D investment level and the tax price faced by the firm are
simultaneously chosen, and ordinary regression methodology is inappropriate in
this situation. For this reason, some researchers have relied on instrumental vari-
ables to estimate the price elasticity, with both the attendant loss of precision
in estimation and problems with finding appropriate instruments to identify the
endogenous variable.7
7See Hall (1993) and Hines (1993) for examples. Possible instruments are the lags of the user
cost variables and the industry level defiators, as well as lagged values of firm characteristics in
the case of micro data.
16The second variant of the quasi-experimental approach suffers from deeper
disadvantages. Absent variations in tax treatment across firms and time, one
is forced to use a constructed R&D price deflator as the price variable in an
R&D demand equation. These defiators typically are a weighted average of R&D
inputs, of which around half is the wages and salaries of technical personnel, and
the other half is some kind of research materials and equipment index. The only
real variation in this variable is over time. This is a very thin reed on which to rest
the estimation of the price elasticity of R&D demand; the estimates will depend
strongly on the other time-varying effects included in the model.
We finish this section with some general methodological problems. First, the
theoretical justification of equation (3.2) is unclear. Some writers have argued for
a much more structural' approach to the R&D equation. This is more easily said
than done, however. Structural investment models for physical capital have had a
poor record of success in empirical testing whether of q-models, Euler equations or
Abel-Blanchard variety (see Bond and Van Reenen 1998, for a survey). Although
various attempts have been made to estimate these more structural forms none
have been conspicuously successful (e.g., Harhoff 1997; Hall 1992) .Asimple way
of motivating the R&D investment equation is to treat it symmetrically to fixed
investment. If the production function can be approximated as a CES (constant
elasticity of substitution) then the first order condition under perfect competition
would have the following form
=&o+ /3Pt + 7Yit + u (3.3)
5FIall (1993) is the only one of the studies in Tables 3 and 4 to use an Euler equation model
for R&D investment demand, but even she is unwilling to trust the estimates and also reports
the simple double log specification of the equation as well.
17where g1,= thelog(R&D stock), Yitlog(output) and p2 =log(usercost of
R&D). Under this model j3 =theHicks-Allen elasticity of substitution. Constant
returns implies that 'y1. The stock is generally calculated using the perpetual
inventory method where G =R+ (1 —6)G_1,capital letters denoting the levels
(not logs) of g and r, and 6 is the knowledge depreciation rate. Unfortunately,
unlike physical capital there is little information upon which to base the initial
condition in constructing this measure.
Several studies specify the R&D equation in terms of a stock rather than a
flow measure (e.g. Shah 1994; Bernstein 1988). It is important to be aware of
this difference when examining the empirical studies as the stock will be much
higher than the flow. However, when the equation is specified in logarithms (as
it usually is) then the difference is not so clear. To see this assume that the R&D




(6 + v =ln( J + 1 + iij
=
Substitutingthis equation into (3.3) gives
Qo + Pt + Jt + + (3.4)
18This implies that we have to allow for firm fixed effects in the R&D equation,
but that otherwise the estimates will be approximately the same, whether we use
the log of the stock of R&D or its flow as the dependent variable.9 That is, as
long as R&D is growing at approximately a constant rate at the firm level and we
include fixed effects in the R&D equation, the interpretation of the coefficients is
the same as it was in equation (3.3).
A deeper problem relates to the adjustment cost function of R&D. 'Reduced
form' approaches will usually use a general dynamic form of (3.4) to capture these.
The problem is that adjustment costs for R&D are likely to be large and this will
be reflected in a large value for the lagged dependent variable. Temporary shocks
to the price are unlikely to have very large effects and even permanent shocks
will take a long time before their full effect is felt. This is compounded by the
fact that R&D is characterised by large fixed and sunk costs so the linear form
of (3.4) may be inappropriate. At the least one might consider modelling the
decision to participate in R&D separately from the amount of R&D conditional
on participation (e.g. Bond, Harhoff and Van Reenen 1999).
4. Econometric Evidence
Since the preponderance of work has been done on the U. S. we focus first on the
results of this work before surveying the smaller number of international studies.
90f course, the fixed effects will also control for many other variables which have been omitted
from the specifications such as firm specific knowledge depreciation rates, so they would probably
also be useful in the version with the stock of R&D.
194.1. Studies on the United States
Table 2 presents a summary of the results of themany studies of the United States
R&E tax credit that have been performed since itsinception in 1981. In this
table we report an attempt to ascertain two standardized results fromthese quite
disparate studies: the price elasticity of R&D (for a typical firm in thesample)
and some kind of estimate of the benefit-cost ratio of the credit. Inmany cases,
the data that would allow us to compute these numberswere not really complete
in the paper, and we were forced to give nothing,or a rough approximation to
the quantity desired. It is apparent from looking at the table that the firstwave
of estimates (those using data through 1983) differsubstantially from the second
(those using data through 1988 and later) in two respects. First, theearly studies
tend to have lower or non-reported tax price elasticities of R&D;only the later
study by McCutchen of large pharmaceutical firms is an exception, and the R&D
equation in this study appears to be misspecified. Secondly, they aretypically
not based on the publicly reported 10-K data maintained by Compustat, buton
internal U. S. Tieasury tax data, surveys and interviews,and, in one case, an
early Compustat file. This makes it difficult to ascertain whether the differences
in results are because the response to the credit variedover time, or because the
type of data used was substantially different.
Unfortunately, the only early study that used a large set of firms from Corn-
pustat (Eisner, Albert, and Sullivan 1983), contains an R&D equation that is not
well-specified, and does not contain any variable to capture the effect of the tax
credit. Thus it is not possible to drawany conclusion about the incentive effect
from the regressions published in this report. In order toinvestigate results using
20Compustat data in the earlier period, Hall (1995) re-estimated theequations iu
Table 6 of Hall 1993 for the time period 1981-82 using ordinary leastsquares. She
found that the estimated tax price elasticity for this earlierperiod using Compu-
stat data wasslightlylower than that using Compustat data for the entire1980s,
but still very significant. In either levels or growthrates, it is approximately -0.6
instead of the -0.85 that was obtained for the whole period. Ifwe multiply this
elasticity times the weighted average effective credit rates for 1981 and 1982 shown
in Table 3 of Hall 1993, we obtain projected increases in R&Dspending during
these two years of 2.1 and 2.3 percent respectively; consistent with therelatively
low increases reported by Eisner and Mansfield usingsurvey data that covered
the same period.
As indicated above, later work using U. S. firm-level data all reaches thesame
conclusion: the tax price elasticity of total R&D spending during the 1980s ison
the order of unity, maybe higher. This result was obtained by Berger(1993) using
a balanced Compustat panel, Hall (1993) usiug an unbalanced Compustat panel,
Hines (1993) using a balanced Compustat panel of multinationals anda tax price
derived from the foreign income allocation rules for R&D rather than thecredit,
and by Baily and Lawrence (1987, 1992) using aggregate 2-digit levelindustry
data. All of these researchers specified an R&D demand equation that contained
lagged R&D, current and lagged output, and occasionally other variables suchas
cash flow. Hall and Hines used instrumental variable techniques tocorrect for
simultaneity in the equation.'°
Thus there is little doubt about the story that the firm-levelpublicly-reported
R&D data tell: the R&D tax credit produces roughly a dollar-for-dollar increase
'0Hall uses lags of the endogenous variables in a GMM estimator.
21in reported R&D spending on the margin. However, it tooksome time in the
early years of the credit for firms to adjust to its presence, so the elasticitywas
somewhat lower during that period. Coupled with the weak incentive effects of
the early design of the credit, this low short run elasticity implieda weak response
of R&D spending in the initial years, causing researchers to interpret itas zero or
insignificant. Thus there is no actual contradiction in the evidence.
However, most of the solid evidence we have to date rests upon theresponse of
total R&D spending to changes in the tax price of "qualified" R&E. Thisqualified
R&E typically accounts for anywhere from 50% to 73% of total R&Dspending.
It also rests on rather shaky tax status data, where the effective tax creditrate
faced by the firm is inferred using information in the Compustat fileson operating
losses and taxable income over the relevant years; whereaggregate data is used, no
attempt has been made to correct for the usability of the credit. There is reason
to believe that inferring the qualified R&E spending by multiplying total R&Don
the 10-K by a common correction factor (such as 0.6) and inferring the tax status
by looking at the 10-K numbers is somewhat unreliable. The only study that
has used the true (confidential) corporate tax data is that by Altshuler(1989)
and unfortunately for our purposes here, it focuses on the weak incentive effect
implied by the credit design rather than evaluating the actual R&D induced.
Basing our conclusions on the response of total R&D spending to a tax price
inferred from Compustat data may suffer from two quite distinctproblems that
deserve further investigation: First, as discussed above, the estimates basedon
public data may be quite noisy, and even misleading. Second, because these esti-
mates are based on the response of reported R&D to the credit itself, theymay
overestimate the true response of R&D spending to a change in price. This is
22sometimes called the "relabelling" problem. If a preferential tax treatment for
a particular activity is introduced, firms have an incentive to make sure that
anything related to that activity is now classified correctly, whereas prior to the
preferential treatment, they may have been indifferent between labelling thecur-
rent expenses associated with R&D as ordinary expenses or R&Dexpenses. There
is some suggestive evidence reported in Eisner, Albert, and Sullivan(1986) con-
cerning the rate of increase in qualified R&E expenditures between 1980 and
1981, when the credit took effect. Using a fairly small sample of firms surveyed
by McGraw-Hill, they were able to estimate that the qualified R&D sharegrew
greatly between 1980 and 1981, less so between 1981 and 1982. This is consistent
with firms learning about the tax credit, and shiftingexpenses around in their
accounts to maximize the portion of R&D that is qualified. It is also consistent
with the tax credit having the desired incentive effect of shiftingspending toward
qualified activities, although the speed of adjustment suggests that accounting
rather than real changes are responsible for some of the increase.
One way around the relabelling problem is to use a method ofestimating the
inducement effect that does not rely directly on the responsiveness of R&D to the
tax credit. This is the method used in U. S. GAO (1989) and in Bernstein's 1986
study of the Canadian R&D tax credit. One takes an estimated price elasticity for
R&D, estimated using ordinary price variation and not tax price variation, and
multiplies this elasticity times the effective marginal credit rate to get a predicted
increase in R&D spending due to the credit rate. For example, if the estimated
short run price elasticity is -0.13 (as in Bernstein 1986), and the marginal effective
credit rate is 4 percent, the estimated short run increase in R&Dspending from
the credit would be 0.5 percent. With a long-run elasticity of -0.5 (Bernstein
23and Nadiri 1989) and a marginal effective credit rate of 10percent, the estimated
increase would be 5 percent. In practice. the difficulty with this method has
been that most of the elasticity estimates we have are based on a few studies
by Bernstein and Nadiri that rely on the time series variation of an R&D price
deflator that evolves as a fairly smooth trend and so is correlated withmany
other changes in the economy." In addition, they are based on either industry
data from the 1950s and 1960s or a very small sample of manufacturing firms,so
they may not generalize that easily.
It is unlikely that the R&D demand elasticity with respect to price is constant
over very different time periods or countries, so it would be desirable to have more
up-to-date estimates in order to use this method. Obviously, one can never be
sure that firms will actually respond to a tax incentive in the way implied by
the price elasticity and measured credit rate, but it would be useful to have this
method available as a check on the more direct approach using tax prices.
4.2.Non-U.S. studies
Few countries have performed as many studies of their incremental R&D tax credit
programs as the United States. There are several reasons for this: 1) vIost of these
schemes have been in place for a shorter time period. 2) They have relied on the
U. S. evaluations for evidence of effectiveness. 3) Internal government studies
may have been done, but these are hard to come by if you are not connected
with researchers within the government in question. The only studies we have
been able to find are displayed in Table 4. They cover Australia, Canada, France,
11See also Goldberg (1979), Nadiri (1980), Cardani and Mohnen (1984), Mohnen, Nadiri and
Prucha (1990).
24Japan, and Sweden, although neither the Canadian nor the Swedish study are
currently applicable, as the tax incentives for R&D in these countries have changed
substantially since the studies were done.
There have been several studies of Canadian data. Dagenais, Mohnen and
Therrien (1998) analyse Canadian firms using the substantial variation in the
R&D tax credit to construct a measure of the user cost. They estimate agen-
eralised Tobit model for the R&D stock which allows the tax price to affect the
amount of R&D performed as well as whether firms conduct R&D at all. They
find a weakly significant effect on the former with a long run effect almost 20 times
the short-run effect. Through a simulation exercise they find that a oneper cent
increase in the federal tax credit generates an average of $0.98 additional R&D
expenditure per dollar of tax revenues foregone.
One of the most comprehensive and carefully done of these studies is that by
the Australian Bureau of Industry Economics. It is noteworthy that the conclu-
sions reached with respect to the tax price elasticity and benefit-cost ratio are
similar to those in the recent United States studies. The methodology used com-
pares the R&D growth rates for firms able and unable to use the tax credit for tax
reasons. This has the obvious disadvantage that assignment to a control group is
endogenous, and that the full marginal variation of the tax credit across firms is
not used, only a dummy variable. In general, the survey evidence that asks firms
by how much they increased their R&D due to the tax credit is consistent with
the econometric evidence.
The French study by Amussen and Berriot (1993) encountered some data
difficulties having to do with matching firms from the enterprisesurveys, R&D
surveys, and the tax records, so the sample is somewhat smaller than expected,
25and may be subject to selection bias. The specification they used for the R&D
demand equation includes the magnitude of the credit claimed as an indication of
the cost reduction due to the credit. If all firms faced the same effective credit rate
on the margin, it is easy to compute the tax price elasticity from the coefficient
of this variable. Unfortunately, this is typically not true in France, so that this
equation is not ideal for the purpose of estimating the tax price elasticity. Even
so, Asmussen and Berriot obtain a plausible estimate of 0.26 (0.08), which is
consistent with other evidence using similar French data and a true tax price.
Few studies have attempted to systematically compare the effectiveness of
various R&D tax incentives across countries, partly because of the formidable
obstacles to understanding the details of each system. McFetridge and Warda
(1983) and Warda (1993) have constructed estimates of the cost of R&D for
large numbers of major R&D-doing countries. Like the Bloom et al (1998) study
discussed in section 2 they found that Japan, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom had the highest tax cost of R&D projects and the United States,
France, Korea, Australia, and Canada the lowest. Bloom, Griffith and Van Reenen
(1999) use the user-costs calculated over eight countries in section 2 to analyse the
effect on R&D. Like the micro studies they also find a long-run elasticity of about
unity but a very low short run elasticity (0.16). More interestingly they identify
significant effects of the foreign user cost of capital which they interpret to mean
that changes in R&D tax credits can stimulate firms into relocating their R&D
across borders. This raises a new dimension in the debate over the efficacy of tax
credits. If some of the estimated increase comes from multinationals relocating
their R&D laboratories it raises the question of tax competition over 'footloose'
R&D.
26The central conclusion at present from studies in other countries is not different
from those using U. S. data: the response to an R&D tax credit tends to befairly
small at first, but increases over time. The effect of incremental schemes with
a moving average base (France, Japan) is the approximately the same as in the
United States: they greatly reduce the incentive effect of the credit.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have considered the tax treatment of R&D and its effect on
firm's decisions. Because it is expensed R&D is tax privileged compared to fixed
investment. There are also a host of special tax breaks, such as the US R&E credit
that further subsidise R&D activities. These have varied extensively over time
and across countries to a much greater extent than physical capital. Our sense
is that the tax treatment of R&D is becoming more lenient and it is likely that
countries will increasingly turn to the tax system and away from direct grants.
One feature of the existing schemes is that they imply very heterogenous prices
facing firms. This variation is a useful source of identification of the effect of price
changes on quantity demanded, although there are still relatively few studies that
have used this. Taken as a whole there is substantial evidence that tax has an
effect of R&D performed, the most compelling evidence coming from the quasi-
experimental approach of calculating a user cost of R&D and estimating an explicit
econometric model. A tax price elasticity of around unity is still a good ballpark
figure, although there is a good deal of variation around this from different studies
as one would expect.
Looking ahead there are several ways in which the literature could grow. First,
27expanding beyond the US to other countries is a trend which clearly needs to be
encouraged. International firm level datasets are becoming more widely available
and we would emphasis to policy makers the imperative of having moreopen,
objective, statistical evaluations of their policies. Secondly, there has been little
attempt to use the variation in tax prices as an instrument for R&D in examining
other variables of interest. For example we are interested in the question of the
productivity effect of R&D and whether the tax credit could be used as a quasi-
experiment to get better calculations of the return to R&D investments. Finally,
the issue political economy cuts through many of the issues here. Why and when
do government's introduce tax breaks? Are they reacting to policies in other
countries as the theory of tax competition suggests they will? Understanding the
process by which different policies are conceived and come to life is as important
as evaluating their effects once they are born and grown up.
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A. Measuring the User Cost of R&D
The user cost of R&D is calculated using the standard approach of Hall and
Jorgensen (1967) and King and Fullerton (1984) and that was extended to the
international setting in OECD (1991) and Devereux and Pearson (1995). The
aim of this approach is to derive the pre-tax real rate of return on the marginal
41investment project that is required to earn a minimum rate of return after tax.
This will be a function of the general tax system, economic variables and the
treatment of R&D expenditure in particular.
We consider a profit maximising firm which increases its R&D stock by one
unit in period one, then disposes of that unit in the second period. The tax system
affects the cost of making this investment in two ways. First, the revenue earned
from the investment is taxed at rate 'r. Second, the cost of the investment to the
firm is reduced by depreciation allowances and tax credits.
Assuming that depreciation allowances are given on a declining balance basis
at rateand begin in the first period the value of the depreciation allowance
will be tq5tinperiod one, and in subsequent periods the value falls by (1 —
Denotethe net present value of the stream of these depreciation allowances A7,




wherertisthe discount rate and the asset and country subscripts have been
omitted for simplicity.
Similarly we can calculate the net present value of the tax credit, A, which
will depend on the type of tax credit available on R&D expenditure. The main
features that affect the value of a tax credit are whether the credit applies to total
or incremental expenditure, how the base level of expenditure is defined in the
incremental case and whether the credit is capped on a firm by firm basis.
Under the assumption of perfect foresight and no tax exhaustion the net
present value of an incremental tax credit with a base that is defined as the
k-period moving average is
= —E(i+rt)B+) (Al)
'21n practice depreciation allowances generally begin in the second period, or are given at half
the rate in the first period. This is taken account of in the empirical application. Depreciation
allowances may also be given on a straight line basis, in which case the expression for A is
slightly different.
42where 'r is the statutory credit rate, B+, is an indicator which takes the
value 1 if R&D expenditure is above its incremental R&D base in period tand
zero otherwise. If the credit has an absolute firm level cap, as in France, then A
is assumed to be as above for firms below the credit caps and zero for those above
the cap.
The depreciation allowances and tax credits vary across types of asset, coun-
tries and time. We consider investment in the manufacturing sector into three
types of asset for use in R&D -currentexpenditure, buildings, and plant and
machinery. An important assumption in the modelling strategy used here is that
current expenditure on R&D is treated as an investment -thatis its full value is
not realised immediately. We also assume that domestic investment is financed
by retained earnings.
In an individual country, the user cost of a domestic investment in R&D for
each asset (indexed by j)isgiven by
(1_ (A, + A)) Pt=
(1 ) [r + ö] (A.2)
where 6 is the economic depreciation rate of the asset. The economic depreciation
rates used are 30% for current expenditure on R&D, 3.61% for buildings and
12.64% for plant and machinery. The domestic user cost of R&D for an individual
country is then given by
PWjP1t (A.3)
where vi3 are weights equal to 0.90 for current expenditure, 0.064 for plant
and machinery and 0.036 for buildings (see OECD (1991)). The tax component
of the user cost of R&D is constructed using a constant real interest rate across




43Country   R&D  R&D Capital   Base for  Carryback   Special Foreign R&D R&D by
(Date Definition of R&D Deprec. Deprec. Tax Credit Incremental and  Credit Treatment for by Domestic Foreign
Enacted) for Tax Credit Rate Rate Rate Tax Credit Carryforward Taxable? SMEs Firms Firms
Canada Frascati, excl. soc sci. 100% 100% or 20% DB 20% 0 3 yr CB yes 40% to R=C$200K expense 20% only?
(1960s) marketing, routine  20% ITC 10 yr CF grant if no tax liab. no ITC, etc.
  testing,etc. not buildings 35% cap eq ITC 
up to $2M
France Frascati, incl. patent dep. 100% 3-yr SL 50% (R(-1)+R(-2))/2 5-yr CF no yes no accel dep ?
(1983) contract R, excl. office  or 5 yr cap. (not buildings) (real) 5-yr for OL recapture TC<50MFF unless cons.
expenses &support personnel accelerated TC refunded no credit
incl. upgrades,SW, overhead
Germany Frascati, incl. Development,  100% 30% DB none NA 1/5 yrs NA assistance via   25% on
improvements, software cap. If acq. 4% SL - bldgs cash grant/ ITC royalties
cash grants?
Italy Frascati, incl. Software 100% accelerated none NA NA ? yes, ceiling
or 5 yr cap.
Japan Frascati, incl. deprec of P&E, 100% accelerated 20% max R since 66 5-yr no 6%R instead 6% credit for  20% on
(1966) deferred charges benefit>1 yr or 5 yr cap. 5% TC - bldgs (max at 10% usual but credit (cap<Y100m) coop with royalties
incl. Software tax liab.) limited to 10% 6% for envir./ foreign labs
health
UK no special definition; treated 100% 100% none NA 5-yr CF NA 25% on
as an expense, however if "sci. res." royalties
US excl. contract R (for doer), 100% 3-yr.,  20% avg of 84-88 R 3/15 yrs yes R/S 3% for not eligible same as
(July 1981) rev. engineering, prod.  15 yr. for bldgs startups domestic
 improv., 35% contract R
TABLE 1
The Tax Treatment of R&D around the World  - G-7 Countries    R&D  R&D Capital   Base for  Carryback   Special Foreign R&D R&D by
Country Definition of R&D Deprec. Deprec. Tax Credit Incremental and  Credit Treatment for by Domestic Foreign
(Date Enacted) for Tax Credit Rate Rate Rate Tax Credit Carryforward taxable SMEs Firms Firms
Australia Frascati, excl. soc sci, 150% 3-yr SL none NA 3/10 yrs NA ceiling; reduced up to 10% of no special
(July 1985) some testing, marketing (not buildings) credit for small project cost provisions
overhead, software R&D programs incl in 1995?
Austria Dev. & improv. of  105% accelerated none NA 5 yr CF NA
  valuable inventions  
Belgium incl. Software 100% 3-yr SL none NA 5 yr CF NA 10-15% addl
or 3 yr cap. 20-yr - bldgs capital deduction
Brazil R&D in computer ind. 100% like investment none NA 4 yr CF
100% of comp.
China (PRC) NA none
Denmark Special tech programmes 100%? 100% ? ? 5-yr CF ?
with EC researchers  
India scientific research 100% 100% none NA ? NA
or knowhow except land
Ireland scientific research 100% 100% (not related) up to 400%? ?? ? ?? TC ceiling of 525000
incl. software 15% otherwise tax treaties
Korea experimental and 100% 18-20% deprec 10% 0 ? no yes; special 10-16% on no special 
research expenditure 5.6% - bldgs 25% avg of  rules for startups royalties provisions
last 2 yrs
Mexico 100% 3-yr SL none NA ? NA
20-yr -bldgs
Netherlands W&S of R&D leading to  100% like investment 12.5-25% 0 8-yrs CF no yes; ceiling on ITC
(1994) prod. dev. (not services) or 5 yr cap. max on R&D wages  
Norway prod. dev., capitalized 100% like investment none NA 10-yr CF NA
knowhow cap if prod. (res. reserve)
Portugal usual 100% none NA ? NA does not  0-27% on
or 3 yr cap. apply royalties
Singapore excl. soc. sci., quality cap. except deprec. as addl deduction NA ? NA yes
control, software some R&D usual (200%)
South Africa scientific research 100% for R 25% dep for cap. none NA ? NA
development of tech.  cap. for D
Spain excl. routine prod. improve. amortize 100% 15%/30% avg of last 2 yrs 5-yr CF - OL NA
incl. software over 5 yrs or depreciate 30%/45% on F.A. (for higher rate) 3-yr CF - TC
Sweden 100% 30% DB none NA tax liability NA
(disc. 84) 4% SL - bldgs
Switzerland none 100% like investment subcontracted ? 2-yr CF ?
incl. software or 5 yr cap. research
Taiwan usual 100% deprec. as 15% 2% revenue 4 yr CF NA
  usual 20% 3% revenue      







no tax on royaltiesDate of Study 1983 1983 1986 1992 1993 1987, 1992 1993 1993 1993 1996
Eisner, Albert, Baily and  Nadiri and
Author(s) Collins (Eisner) and Sullivan Mansfield Swenson Berger Lawrence Hall McCutchen Hines Mamuneas
 
Period of Credit 1981:2 1981-82 1981-1983 1981-88 1981-88 1981-89 1981-91 1982-85 1984-89 1956-1988
Control period 1981:1 1980 not relevant 1975-80 1975-80 1960-80? 1980 1975-80 not relevant not relevant
Data source McGraw-Hill McGraw-Hill surveys Stratified random Compustat Compustat NSF R&D by ind Compustat IMS data Compustat +  
 surveys Compustat, IRS ind. survey and 10Ks
Data Type 99 firms ~600 firms for R&D 110 firms 263 firms 263 firms 12 2-digit inds. 800 firms 20 large drug 116 multinationals 15 industries
3,4-digit ind for tax (balanced) (balanced) (unbalanced) firms
Methodology (3) Event (1) Dummy (4) Survey (1) Dummy (1),(3) (1),(2) (2) Elasticity (1) Dummy (2) Elasticity elasticity
 
Compare pre-




compared pre- and 
post-ERTA for R&D 
above/below base
Asked if R&D tax 
incentive increased




Log R&D demand 




with tax price 
var.
Research 




eqn with tax 





R&D lag 1&2, current 
& lag sales, CF
Log S, change in 
LTDebt lag 1&2
Lag R/S,  Ind. 
R/S, Inv/S Ind. 
Inv/S, CF/S, 
Tobin's q, GNP
Lag R&D, current 








Dom. & for. tax 
price & sales, 
Ind, firm 
dummies output, public R&D
 
Estimated                    
  Elasticity insig. insig. 0.35? ? 1.0-1.5 0.75 (0.25) 1.0-1.5 0.28-10.0? 1.2-1.6 0.95-1
Estimated






Not a good  
experiment; too early, 
insuff. Control for TC, 
poor functional form
Increases get 











assumes firm is 
taxpayer
Response 




low CF firms; 
problem with eq 
nonhomothetic
Compares firms 
w and w/o 
foreign tax 
credits - different 
experiment
Empirical Studies of the Effectiveness of the R&D Tax Credit - United States
Table 2Country Canada Canada Sweden Canada Japan Australia Canada G7 and Australia
Date of Study 1983 1985 1986 1986 1988 1993 1998 1999
McFetridge Mansfield Goto and Australian Bernstein Bloom, Griffith
Author(s) and Warda and Switzer Mansfield Bernstein Wakasugi BIE and Van Reenen
 
Period of Credit 1962-82 1980-83 1981-1983 1981-88 1980 1984-1994 1964-1992 1979-1994
Control period NA not relevant not relevant 1975-80   non-users
Data source Statistics Stratified survey Stratified random  prior estimates   ABS R&D survey Canadian  manufacturing 
Canada interview survey IR&D board manufacturing sector (panel
Data Type aggregate 55 firms (30% of R) 40 firms firms?    >1000 firms sector estimates)
     
Methodology (2) Elasticity (4) Survey (4) Survey (2) Elasticity   (1), (4) elasticity elasticity
  Use elasticity of Asked if R&D tax Asked if R&D tax Multiply prior    Log R&D demand eqn  cost function R&D demand eqn
0.6 and tax  incentive increased incentive increased elasticity estimate   with credit dummy approach with tax-adjusted 
  price of R&D spending spending times credit rate   control/no control user cost
Controls NA No control years, NA     Lag R&D, Log Size output lagged R&D, output
unclear if these       Growth, other factor prices country and time
are total increases   tax loss dummy dummies
from tax credit Gov support dummy
 
Estimated            
  Elasticity 0.6 0.04-0.18 small 0.13 ~1.0 0.14 in short-run .16 in short-run
Estimated 0.30 in long-run 1.1 in long-run
Benefit-Cost 0.60 0.38-0.67 0.3 to 0.4 0.83-1.73   0.6-1.0
Comments Elasticity comes Elasticity estimated Increases get  Larger figure increased R&D Elasticity is comb. find effect of 
from Nadiri(1980) from McF&Warda larger as time includes output by 1% of survey evidence tax credits on
"tentative" tax cr. of 20% and passes. effects and control re-location decision
  obs. R increase     group analysis
See the text for a more complete description of methodologies (1)-(4).
TABLE 3




and Berriot and Therrien
1985-89 1975-92
   
Canadian Compustat
DGI, and MRT data Statcan deflators
339 firms 434 firms
(1) Demand (1) Demand
R&D demand eqn Log R&D stock eqn
with log(credit)* with log(credit)*
Indicator for ceiling Sample sel. Model
Logs of gov subsidy,  Log sales, log capital, 
size,  ind. R stock, lag R stock
size sq, concentration, fixed effects
immob per head
   
0.26 (.08) 0.40 (.25)
? 0.98 (LR)
Estimated elasticity  Includes a selection eqn
is credit elasticity for doing R&D; elasticity
divided by elasticity  derived from stock est.
of tax price wrt credit C-B includes outputFigure 1 - Tax Component of R&D user cost













































CanadaFigure 2 - Tax component of the user cost of R&D 






































































5th percentile 95th percentile Median First quartile Third quartileFigure 4






























5th percentile  95th percentile lower quartile upper quartile median